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I 
INTRODUCTION AND IMPETUS 
Some baby boomers, and those who will follow them, will face 
estate planning issues that no other generation has had to 
concern itself with: transfers, via trusts, of real property 
impacted by hazardous substances and the long liability reach of 
modern environmental laws.1  These laws can transform the 
potential boon of real property held in trust for one’s benefit 
into a nightmare of ongoing or potential litigation and liability.  
Those who advise on estate and environmental issues must 
therefore understand the risks involved in transferring or 
holding impacted property in trust and the types of structures 
and advance planning that will best benefit and protect those to 
whom the settlors2 intend to gift.  This Article addresses these 
issues, as well as many of the questions raised by the need to 
structure gifts of impacted real property in a manner that carries 
 
1 Note that we are careful here to avoid mentioning the inheritance of impacted 
property.  For reasons discussed herein, specific rules may apply to property 
transferred through inheritance or bequest.  While these transfers are important, 
and therefore discussed extensively, the main focus of this Article is the potential 
liability implications of lifetime transfers of property interests through trusts. 
2 The terms “settlor” and “trustor” are synonymous and refer to the creator of a 
trust.  These terms are used interchangeably throughout this Article. 
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out the settlor’s intent without imposing additional personal 
liability on those gifted. 
In particular, and with a focus on California law, this Article 
addresses the question of under what circumstances, if any, can 
trustees and/or beneficiaries be held liable as “owners?”  This 
question is crucial because owners are strictly liable under the 
Superfund Law–the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).3  Other 
questions addressed in this Article include: If the beneficiary or 
trustee is potentially liable, is such liability personal or limited to 
trust assets?  What steps can be taken to reduce or eliminate 
exposure of the trust assets and the beneficiary and/or trustee’s 
own personal assets to clean-up liability?  What potential 
defenses are available to trustees and beneficiaries? 
CERCLA is a notoriously difficult statute to interpret, and 
most CERCLA cases and opinions are convoluted and complex.  
Many of the questions addressed here drift into uncharted 
waters with no appellate opinions directly on point.  Our 
purpose, therefore, is to mark known shoals and sandbars, graph 
known or reasonably expected channels, explore safe harbors, 
and chart what now seems to be the optimum course, 
recognizing as we go that the current is swift, and we don’t 
control the weather. 
II 
THE QUICK-AND-DIRTY ON PASSING OFF DIRTY PROPERTY 
A.  Trustee Liability 
As a general rule, trust law precludes holding trustees 
personally liable under CERCLA without malfeasance of some 
sort.  There is, however, some authority for holding trustees 
personally liable if they engage in “misfeasance.”4  In the 
absence of either malfeasance or misfeasance, trustees are only 
liable as trustees and therefore are only liable to the extent that 
trust assets are available to indemnify them.  They have no 
 
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006).  Congress amended CERCLA with the 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA).  These statutes 
are referred to collectively herein as CERCLA. 
4 Malfeasance is the act of doing a bad thing.  Misfeasance is failing to stop a bad 
thing from happening. 
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personal exposure, absent malfeasance or misfeasance.  Trustees 
can take actions to protect themselves by prudently managing 
property and handling environmental issues in an attentive, well-
advised manner. 
B.  Beneficiary Liability 
No statutory protection exists to protect beneficiaries from 
liability under CERCLA.  There is scant case law on the 
potential liability of beneficiaries where that liability is derived 
from their status as beneficiaries.  Many unanswered legal 
questions exist, in particular, whether beneficiaries are owners 
and, therefore, potentially responsible parties (PRPs) under 
CERCLA, with all of the far reaching liability implications of 
that status.  Based on current case law and statutory 
interpretation, there is more than just a reasonable argument 
that beneficiaries are owners under CERCLA because 
beneficiaries’ possession of equitable title appears sufficient to 
establish owner liability.  If they are owners, beneficiaries, 
absent a defense, will face potential personal liability for 
environmental conditions on real property held in trust for their 
benefit.  Owners are also strictly liable for any actions of third 
parties, such as tenants, although those parties also remain 
liable. 
Beneficiaries do have certain defenses to CERCLA liability, 
including the “inheritance or bequest defense,” a subset of the 
“third-party defense.”5  However, the scope of the inheritance or 
bequest defense is uncertain.  Further, as in all CERCLA cases, 
if beneficiaries are liable, CERCLA entitles them to 
contribution from other responsible parties, and there may be 
many other contractual rights and/or common law theories that 
may present an opportunity to recover damages.6 
C.  Caveats 
It is important to note that owners of contaminated property 
must always clean up owned property that poses a threat to 
human health or the environment, regardless of whether or not 
they are liable under CERCLA, and that third parties have 
 
5 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3); see also id. § 9601(35)(A)(iii). 
6 Id. § 113(f); see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (West 1997) (defining nuisance). 
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many rights not dependent upon CERCLA liability.  For 
example, without obtaining a judgment under CERCLA, 
regulatory agencies may require cleanup through the issuance of 
orders containing stiff penalties for noncompliance, and adjacent 
and nearby property owners may bring an action for damages 
caused by migration regardless of CERCLA liability. 
III 
THE LANDSCAPE OF THE LAW AND SOME HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
A.  CERCLA in General 
CERCLA imposes liability on covered persons and provides a 
mechanism for the recovery7 or contribution8 of response costs 
incurred in remediating properties impacted with hazardous 
substances.9  CERCLA plaintiffs can include private individuals 
as well as state and/or federal entities.  Covered persons that are 
potentially liable include all present owners and/or operators,10 
past owners and/or operators,11 arrangers (also called 
“generators” or “disposers”),12 and acceptors (also called 
“disposal facilities”).13 
Operator, arranger, and acceptor liability turns on whether 
defendants performed certain acts, such as generating a waste 
containing a hazardous substance, that bring them within the 
defined class of covered persons.  By comparison, potential 
liability for owners turns only on a defendant’s status as an 
owner.  Though CERCLA case law does nuance ownership 
liability in certain circumstances, such as where interim owners 
are considered innocent interim owners if they did not 
 
7 Cost recovery actions are covered by CERCLA section 107 and are available to 
reimburse voluntarily incurred response costs.  United States v. Atlantic Research 
Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2338 (2007). 
8 Section 113(f) of CERCLA addresses contribution actions which are only 
available to responsible parties and only after these parties have been sued under 
section 106 or 107 or otherwise have resolved their liability with the government.  
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 162–63 (2004). 
9 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (defining covered persons). 
10 Id. § 9607(a)(1). 
11 Id. § 9607(a)(2). 
12 Id. § 9607(a)(3). 
13 Id. § 9607(a)(4). 
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exacerbate contamination, it is never favorable to be a 
CERCLA owner without reasonable certainty of a defense. 
B.  The Law as Applied to Trustees 
1.  History and Overview of Trustee Liability Under CERCLA 
a.  Quadion Corp. v. Mache14 
Quadion is the seminal case involving allegations of CERCLA 
liability leveled at a trustee.15  The case is historically significant 
because it presented for the first time the possibility of naming 
trustees as defendants in CERCLA cases.16  However, Quadion 
is unclear as to whether the plaintiffs sought to reach only the 
trust assets or whether they attempted to reach the trustee’s 
personal assets.  The case therefore sheds little light on the 
potential personal liability of trustees. 
Two years after Quadion, and perhaps in light of it, 
commentators asked the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to exempt trustees from potential personal liability.  The 
EPA refused.17 
b.  City of Phoenix v. Garbage Services Co.18 
City of Phoenix brought the issue of trustee personal liability 
to a head by imposing personal liability on a bank trustee for 
contamination resulting from the use of trust property as a 
landfill.19  This landfill property was ultimately owned by a 
testamentary trust.20  The trustee, Valley National Bank, 
administered the trust, but not the site, and never involved itself 
 
14 Quadion Corp. v. Mache, 738 F. Supp. 270 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
15 See id.  The government actually named an individual trustee as a defendant in 
the earlier case of United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 
(D.N.H. 1985).  The court granted summary judgment in the individual’s favor; the 
government did not appeal. 
16 Quadion, 738 F. Supp. at 272–73. 
17 Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (2008).  The EPA failed 
to come right out and express what was likely the agency’s primary concern: that if 
such an exception existed, unscrupulous polluters would simply create trusts, name 
themselves as trustees, and then thumb their noses at the regulators while violating 
every environmental law on the books. 
18 City of Phoenix v. Garbage Servs. Co., 827 F. Supp. 600 (D. Ariz. 1993). 
19 Id. at 607. 
20 Id. at 601. 
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in the landfill operations.21  The City of Phoenix eventually 
condemned and remediated the site.22  More than twenty years 
after the bank acquired the landfill, the City of Phoenix filed suit 
against the bank, seeking to recover its response costs pursuant 
to section 107 of CERCLA.23  The bank argued that trustees 
were not owners for purposes of CERCLA.24  Moreover, given 
the role of trustee, the bank argued that even if a trustee was an 
owner for CERCLA purposes, the trustee could not be held 
personally liable.25  The court rejected both arguments.26 
The court breezed by the first question, quickly ruling that 
trustees could be owners subject to CERCLA claims,27 then 
turned to the more difficult question of trustee personal liability 
under CERCLA.28  The court attempted to fashion a uniform 
federal rule that maintained both the congressional intent 
behind CERCLA (that is, to make anyone other than the 
taxpayers pay for cleaning up impacted sites) and general legal 
principles regarding personal liability for trustees.29  After 
considering the Restatement of Torts30 and other authority, the 
court announced the following rules: 
 (1) Where a trustee is held liable under subsection 107(a)(1) 
as the current owner of contaminated property, the trustee’s 
liability is limited to the extent that the trust assets are 
sufficient to indemnify him. 
 
21 Id. at 602. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 See id. at 601.  Whether trustees fall into any of the other classes of potential 
CERCLA defendants is a more straightforward question.  The analysis for 
operator, arranger, and disposer liability turns on questions of actions, not status, as 
owner liability does.  Where a trustee acts as operator, arranger, or disposer under 
the CERCLA cases, the trustee will be a covered person under CERCLA.  The 
issue then becomes whether the acts creating such liability are such that the 
protection afforded trustees by section 107(n) of CERCLA will not apply.  See infra 
Parts III.B.1.c–e. 
25 See City of Phoenix, 827 F. Supp. at 602. 
26 Id. at 601, 604–05. 
27 Id. at 605.  This point is now settled law such that the answer to the “owner” 
question turns on governing state law.   For a more detailed discussion of this rule, 
see infra Part III.B.2. 
28 City of Phoenix, 827 F. Supp. at 602–07. 
29 Id. at 603. 
30 Id. (considering RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 264–265 (1959)). 
 408 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 23, 401 
 (2) Where a trustee is held liable under subsection 107(a)(2) 
[as the owner or operator of a facility at the time of disposal], 
but the trustee did not have the power to control the use of 
trust property, the trustee’s liability is limited to the extent that 
the trust assets are sufficient to indemnify him. 
 (3) Where a trustee had the power to control the use of 
trust property, and knowingly allowed the property to be used 
for the disposal of hazardous substances, then the trustee is 
liable under subsection 107(a)(2) to the same extent that he 
would be liable if he held the property free of trust.31 
Thus, the City of Phoenix rule allowed for personal CERCLA 
liability for malfeasant and misfeasant trustees.32 
c.  The Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit 
Insurance Protection Act of 1996 
City of Phoenix was a rallying cry for the banking lobby.  
Three years later, Congress passed the Asset Conservation, 
Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996, 
which eventually became section 107(n) of CERCLA.33  Section 
107(n)(1) proclaims that, in general, a fiduciary’s liability “for 
the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance at, 
from, or in connection with a . . . facility held in a fiduciary 
capacity shall not exceed the assets held in the fiduciary 
capacity.”34  Section 107(n)(4) also provides fiduciaries a “safe 
harbor” from personal liability when they undertake certain 
activities that might otherwise raise the specter of CERCLA 
liability.35 
It is critical to recognize that neither the limitation on liability 
nor the safe harbor provision applies if the fiduciary is negligent 
and that negligence “causes or contributes to the release or 
threatened release.”36  By its own terms, section 107(n) excludes 
fiduciaries from its protection where the fiduciary is liable under 
CERCLA as an individual–for example, as a generator–as 
 
31 Id. at 605. 
32 Id. at 606–07. 
33 Pub. L. No. 104-208, sec. 2501-2505, § 107, 110 stat. 3009-462 to 469 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991, 9601, 9607 (2006)). 
34 42 U.S.C. § 9607(n)(1) (including trustees in the list of covered fiduciaries). 
35 Id. § 9607(n)(4). 
36 Id. § 9607(n)(3). 
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opposed to only as a fiduciary.37  The safe harbor provision also 
does not apply where a fiduciary acts in a manner other than as a 
fiduciary, such as acting as a beneficiary or benefiting as a result 
of that behavior.38  The safe harbor is not safe where the 
individual or entity is both fiduciary and beneficiary and the 
fiduciary benefits in a manner that exceeds “customary or 
reasonable compensation[] and incidental benefits”39 or acts in 
his or her own self-interest.40  Section 107(n) also excludes 
certain classes of fiduciaries from the definition of “fiduciary”41 
and therefore from protection of the section.42 
d.  The First Interpretation of 107(n): Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. 
NationsBank43 
In Canadyne, the defendants included the bank trustee of the 
settlor’s testamentary trust, as well as an inter vivos trust 
 
37 Id. § 9607(n)(2).  Thus, if the trustee committed acts such that the trustee is an 
operator, arranger, or acceptor, the trustee could be liable in their individual 
capacity as operator, arranger, or acceptor, as opposed to their capacity as trustee. 
38 Id. §§ 9607(n)(2), (7).  Section 107(n)(7) uses “and” in subsection (B)(i), while 
the analogous California Health and Safety Code, section 25548.5, discussed at 
footnote 60, does not.  No appellate opinion discusses this difference, but 
superficially, it appears that to maintain the protection afforded by state law one 
only has to satisfy the requirements of a single subsection of section 25548.5, while 
one would have to satisfy every subsection of CERCLA section 107(n)(7) in order 
to maintain the protection afforded under federal law. 
39 42 U.S.C. § 9607(n)(7)(B)(ii).  This rule appears to apply even if receipt of the 
benefits would be legal under other applicable law. 
40 Id. § 9607(n)(7). 
41 Id. § 9607(n)(5). 
42 Specifically, under CERCLA, a trustee is not a “fiduciary” for the purpose of 
the safe harbor provision where they are the trustee of a trust that engages in a 
business for profit, or is organized to engage in a business for profit, unless the 
reason for the trust was the facilitation of an estate plan or plans, due to the 
incapacity of the estate owner.  Id. § 9607(n)(5)(A)(ii)(I).  Also excluded are 
fiduciaries of trusts that would be considered fraudulent in that they were created 
specifically and intentionally to avoid liability.  Id. § 9607(n)(5)(A)(ii)(II).  Again, 
there are less than a handful of cases that interpret and/or apply CERCLA section 
107(n).  See, e.g., United States v. Newmont USA Ltd., 504 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1057 
(E.D. Wash. 2007) (“[Section 107(n)] limits a fiduciary's liability to the value of the 
trust assets . . . but does not, as the United States suggests, require that the payment 
for potential liability be from the trust assets.”); see also Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. 
NationsBank, 183 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999); Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Concrete 
Sales & Servs., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (M.D. Ga. 1998); Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. 
Shulimson Bros., 1 F. Supp. 2d 553 (W.D.N.C. 1998). 
43 Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1269. 
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established for the benefit of the settlor’s daughters.44  When 
sued for response costs under CERCLA, the trustee bank 
moved to dismiss on the grounds that it was not a “person” for 
purposes of CERCLA liability and that section 107(n) excluded 
it from liability.45  The district court dismissed the matter on the 
first grounds and failed to address the bank’s section 107(n) 
argument.46  On appeal, however, the U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit determined that, as a general 
principle of Georgia law, trustees could be owners of real 
property and therefore subject to CERCLA liability.47  However, 
without more than the mere fact of being a trustee, fiduciaries 
had no personal liability exposure and were only liable as 
trustees.48 
Canadyne raised other questions, however, because the 
individual trustees in that case held an interest in the property 
other than the interest they held as trustees; the bank was also a 
lender.49  As such, the Eleventh Circuit reached some aspects of 
the section 107(n) question regarding under what circumstances 
personal liability could be imposed on trustees with other roles.50  
While the section 107(n) inquiry in Canadyne was necessarily 
fact specific, the court did make some helpful legal 
generalizations.  Specifically, the court rejected the contention 
that the combination of a lending relationship and a fiduciary 
duty would exclude an entity from section 107(n) protection.51  
Thus, a bank trustee who also acted as mortgagor, for example, 
is still able to assert section 107(n) as a defense to personal 
liability.52  The court also refused to find the trustee negligent, 
within the meaning of the negligence exception in section 
107(n)(3), based on the fiduciary’s vicarious liability for acts of 
employees,53 even though the partnership would be vicariously 
 
44 Id. at 1271. 
45 Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. NationsBank, 982 F. Supp. 886, 888 (M.D. Ga. 
1997), rev’d, 183 F.3d 1269. 
46 Id. at 891. 
47 Canadyne, 183 F.3d at 1273–74. 
48 Id. at 1274 n.7. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 1274. 
51 See id. at 1275 n.9. 
52 See id. 
53 Id. at 1275 n.10. 
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liable for the actions of its employees under general negligence 
principles.54  Finally, the Eleventh Circuit refused to find 
negligence and apply the negligence exception to section 107(n) 
protection based on the fiduciary’s failure to act.55  The court 
reasoned that, because CERCLA is a strict liability statute, 
CERCLA does not impose a duty to prevent others from 
acting.56  As such, a failure of the fiduciary to prevent the release 
of a hazardous substance could never support a negligence 
theory and therefore could never bring a fiduciary within the 
negligence exception in section 107(n)(3).57  Thus, the defendant 
trustee was entitled to the protection of section 107(n). 
e.  California Health and Safety Code Section 25548 
The California legislature, like Congress, also took action in 
1996 and enacted California Health and Safety Code section 
25548–the California law analogous to CERCLA section 
107(n).58  The stated intent of section 25548 is “to specify the 
type of lender and fiduciary conduct that will not incur liability 
for hazardous material contamination.”59  As such, section 25548 
provides exemptions and limitations to potential fiduciary 
liability under the environmental laws.60  Thus, section 25548 
 
54 Id. 
[E]ven assuming arguendo that the Bank was a general partner, Canadyne 
must show the Bank itself negligently caused or contributed to the pollution.  
Just because under state partnership law a partnership and its partners may 
be vicariously liable for the negligence of any one partner or employee of the 
partnership does not mean every partner herself negligently caused the 
accident.  Vicarious liability, or “imputed negligence,” is not the same as 
saying negligence of a fiduciary caused or contributed to the release, as 
required under [section 107(n)]. 
Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
55 Id. at 1275. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Hazardous Materials Liability of Lenders and Fiduciaries, ch. 6.96, 1996 Cal. 
Legis. Serv. 612 (West) (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25548 (West 
1999)). 
59 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25548(b) (emphasis added) (defining 
fiduciary); see also CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 83–84 (West 2002) (defining “trust 
company” and “trustee” respectively). 
60 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25548(b).  Fiduciaries may endure exposure 
to liability for myriad sorts of things.  However, in the interest of conciseness, 
hereinafter, wherever this Article refers to trustee or fiduciary liability or potential  
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residually identifies the universe of potential liability for 
fiduciaries.  Specifically, section 25548 addresses the exceptions 
to and limitations on “the liability of trustees, executors, and 
other fiduciaries for hazardous material contamination involving 
property that is part of the fiduciary estate.”61 
Section 25548.3 eliminates personal liability for fiduciaries by 
confining their potential liability to the estate assets.62  The 
caveats come in section 25548.5, which makes it clear that 
fiduciaries do not have blanket immunity from liability under the 
environmental laws.63  The protection of the limitation of liability 
in section 25548.3 will not apply where (1) that liability results 
from the fiduciary’s negligence or recklessness;64 (2) the fiduciary 
conducts a removal or remedial action without providing proper 
notice to the appropriate agency;65 (3) the potential liability 
results from acts outside the scope of the fiduciary duties;66 (4) 
the fiduciary relationship is fraudulent in that its raison d’être is 
to avoid liability;67 or (5) the fiduciary is also a beneficiary, or 
benefits from acting as fiduciary, in a manner over and above 
that considered customary or reasonable for a fiduciary.68 
The courts have yet to interpret or apply section 25548 in an 
appellate decision.  There is therefore little to guide parties and 
counsel with respect to when personal liability will, or will not, 
result under California law.  It is likely that the example set by 
the federal courts in interpreting CERCLA section 107(n) would 
be highly persuasive.  The federal courts, as discussed above, 
have held that trustees can have other roles and still be 
protected, that trustees won’t be held liable where liability is 
solely vicarious, and that failure to prevent a release will not 
necessarily remove the trustee’s protection.69  California courts 
have, however, been mavericks in the past.  As the law currently 
 
liability, such liability is confined to that which might result from suit or action 
pursuant to state or federal environmental laws and/or regulations. 
61 Id. § 25548(a)(2). 
62 Id. §§ 25548(a)–(b). 
63 Id. §§ 25548.5(c)–(g). 
64 Id. § 25548.5(c). 
65 Id. § 25548.5(d). 
66 Id. § 25548.5(e). 
67 Id. § 25548.5(f). 
68 Id. § 25548.5(g). 
69 See supra Part III.B.1.d. 
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stands, fiduciaries who act exclusively as fiduciaries, act 
responsibly, and give sound guidance should be shielded from 
personal liability. 
2.  Trustee Ownership Status 
State law answers the question of whether a trust is an owner 
of property under CERCLA.  As noted above, owners are 
generally strictly, jointly, and severally liable for all 
contamination prior to or during their time of ownership, subject 
to certain defenses and nuances of case law, such as the 
“innocent landowner defense.”70 
Decisions in a number of states answer the question 
affirmatively.71  Courts in other states, however, reached the 
opposite conclusion.72  California courts have yet to rule on the 
exact question of whether trustees can be owners for CERCLA 
purposes.  However, in Castlerock Estates, Inc. v. Estate of 
Markham, the Northern District of California addressed the 
closely related question of whether a conservator or executor of 
an estate could be liable as an owner under CERCLA.73  The 
 
70 36 AM. JUR. 2D Forfeitures and Penalties § 41 (2001).  The innocent landowner 
defense basically provides that, if a party adequately investigates a property’s 
condition prior to purchase and finds nothing, then that party is not liable if 
hazardous substances are later found to be present.  It is important to remember, 
however, that regulatory agencies can still force a cleanup by the property owners, 
regardless of CERCLA liability and regardless of the source of contamination. 
71 Quadion Corp. v. Mache, 738 F. Supp. 270, 273–74 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (finding 
that trustees are “persons” for purposes of CERCLA and can therefore be 
“owners” under the statute if they hold, or held, legal title to a facility or vessel); see 
also Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Concrete Sales & Servs., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1367–
68 (M.D. Ga. 1998) (“[A]bsent wrongdoing in their individual capacity the Trustees 
are not liable insofar as their personal assets are concerned but may be held liable 
in their fiduciary capacity to the extent of the assets held in the . . . [t]rust.”).  The 
trustee defendants also attempted to assert the third-party defense in CERCLA 
section 9607(b)(3).  Briggs & Stratton Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1368–69.  The court 
rejected this argument given the factual history of the case, thereby implying that 
the defense may be viable in appropriate circumstances.  Id.  See also Cardington 
Road Site Coal. v. Snyder Props., Inc., No. C-3-88-632, 1994 WL 1631033, at *11 
(S.D. Ohio 1994) (finding that trustees are “owners” under CERCLA). 
72 United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1358–59 
(N.D. Ill. 1992) (applying Illinois law to determine that the beneficiary of a trust is 
the owner for CERCLA purposes and therefore trustees cannot be liable). 
73 Castlerock Estates, Inc. v. Estate of Markham, 871 F. Supp. 360, 364–66 (N.D. 
Cal. 1994). 
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Castlerock court discussed the similarities between 
conservatorships and trusts and noted that 
since a conservator is bound by the laws of the state to seek a 
court order to sell or convey property, the legal title of a 
conservator is a lesser form of title than that possessed by a 
trustee.  Conservators and executors hold title by reason of 
office in contrast to a trustee who holds title by deed.  All acts 
done by a conservator or an executor vis-à-vis property require 
a court’s approval except where additional powers are given by 
the instrument which created their office.  On the other hand, 
a trustee holds legal title for benefit of beneficiaries who have 
equitable title.  Generally powers of a trustee are greater and 
broader than those of an executor or conservator.  Actions of a 
trustee require court approval in fewer instances.  The trustee 
obtains written title by the very trust instrument itself. 
 A stricter test for CERCLA liability should apply to 
conservators and executors because their title is much lesser 
than is the title held by trustees.74 
From cases holding that an easement holder is not an owner 
for CERCLA purposes, some treatises extrapolate that 
CERCLA intended to exclude entities that hold anything less 
than a fee simple interest from liability.75  This view, however, is 
contrary to the implications of Castlerock and cases addressing 
related contexts.76  It seems far more likely that California courts 
 
74 Id. at 366.  The court ultimately concluded that, with respect to executors and 
conservators, “bare legal title to real property” was insufficient to support 
CERCLA “ownership” liability.  Id. at 364.  Nevertheless, conservators and 
executors could still be liable as owners under CERCLA if sufficient “indicia of 
ownership” existed.  Id. at 364.  The language in Castlerock quoted above, however, 
makes clear that the test for “ownership” for conservators and executors is distinct 
from that of trustees.  California courts have yet to articulate the specific test for 
CERCLA ownership to apply to trustees. 
75 8 MILLER & STARR, CAL. REAL ESTATE § 23:35 (3d ed. 2000). 
 The term “owner,” as used in CERCLA, was probably intended to refer 
only to the fee simple owner or owners, and not to other persons such as 
trustees, licensees, remaindermen, easement holders, or the like who might 
have some interest in the property. 
 . . . The owner of an easement on polluted property who has not 
contributed to the contamination is not liable for cleanup costs as an owner 
or an operator under CERCLA even though the easement owner was in a 
position to prevent the contamination.  The owner of an easement merely 
holds the right to use the property of another, which is not a sufficient 
interest for the imposition of liability under CERCLA. 
Id. 
76 See, e.g., City of Grass Valley v. Newmont Mining Corp., No. 2:04-CV-00149, 
2007 WL 4287603, at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that ownership of the mineral  
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will find trustees of impacted properties to be owners under 
CERCLA. 
C.  The Law as Applied to Beneficiaries 
Based on the statute itself and existing case law, CERCLA is 
merciless when it comes to beneficiaries.  Future heirs and/or 
beneficiaries would therefore be well-advised to take steps to 
ensure that they will be able to satisfy the elements of the 
statutory defenses within CERCLA section 9607(b) once title 
vests in them.  The elements of the third-party defense and the 
inheritance or bequest defense, a subdefense of the third-party 
defense, are discussed below.  In addition, there may be other 
potential options for limiting liability–such as using a limited 
liability company (LLC) to receive and hold title–that are 
untested and therefore uncertain as to effectiveness.  These are 
also discussed below. 
1.  Potential CERCLA Owner Liability and Statutory Defenses of 
Beneficiaries 
Even if they are owners and therefore covered persons under 
CERCLA, beneficiaries can avoid liability if they can 
successfully assert one of the affirmative defenses in section 
9607(b).77  One such defense is the third-party defense.78 
Successful assertion of the third-party defense requires a 
showing that the release or threatened release of a hazardous 
substance is attributable solely to the “act or omission of a third 
 
estate was sufficient to impose liability as an owner under CERCLA); see also 
United States v. Newmont USA Ltd., 504 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1061–69 (E.D. Wash. 
2007) (concluding, without actually adopting the “indicia of ownership” test in Long 
Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Dorothy B. Godwin Cal. Living Trust, 32 F.3d 1364 (9th 
Cir. 1994), that the United States held sufficient indicia of ownership in an Indian 
reservation to be held an “owner” under CERCLA); Nestle USA Beverage Div., 
Inc. v. D.H. Overmyer Co., No. C-96-1207, 1998 WL 321450, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 1998) 
(concluding that a lessee was an owner under CERCLA).  But see Commander Oil 
Corp. v. Barlo Equip. Corp., 215 F.3d 321, 328–29 (2d Cir. 2000) (“While the typical 
lessee should not be held liable as an owner, there may be circumstances when 
owner liability for a lessee would be appropriate.”). 
77 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2006) (providing the “statutory” defenses to 
CERCLA liability). 
78 Id. § 9607(b)(3).  The other defenses are the “act of God” defense in section 
9607(b)(1) and the “act of war” defense in section 9607(b)(2).  The final defense is 
section 9607(b)(4), which allows for an amalgam of any of the other three defenses. 
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party other than . . . one whose act or omission occurs in 
connection with a contractual relationship.”79  Thus, if a 
contractual relationship exists between the covered person and 
the third party, the defense fails.  CERCLA section 9601(35)(A) 
provides the definition of “contractual relationship” as used in 
the third-party defense.80  In so doing, this section refines the 
third-party defense into three subdefenses, referred to here as 
the innocent landowner defense,81 the government agency 
defense,82 and the inheritance or bequest defense.83 
a.  The Third-Party Defense 
Barring an act of war or God, establishment of the third-party 
defense is the first necessary step for any defendant hoping to 
find a refuge from liability within CERCLA itself.84  In order to 
successfully assert the defense, the defendant must prove all of 
the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence: 
1. The release or threatened release is attributable solely to 
 the acts or omissions of a third party.85 
 
2. The defendant “exercised due care with respect to the 
 hazardous substance concerned, taking into consideration 
 the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of 
 all relevant facts and circumstances.”86 
 
3. The defendant “took precautions against foreseeable acts or 
 omissions of any such third party and the consequences that 
 could foreseeably result from such acts or omissions.”87 
 
4. The act or omission did not occur in connection with a 
 contractual relationship between the defendant and the 
 third party.88 
 
79 Id. § 9607(b)(3). 
80 Id. § 9601(35)(A). 
81 See id. § 9601(35)(A)(i). 
82 See id. § 9601(35)(A)(ii). 
83 See id. § 9601(35)(A)(iii). 
84 See id. § 9607(b). 
85 Id. § 9607(b)(3). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 See id. 
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 In order to show the absence of a contractual relationship 
with the third party, the defendant must prove that any contract 
existing between the third party and the defendant at the time of 
the release or threatened release was something other than an 
instrument transferring interest in land.89  By way of the limited 
examples in section 9601(35)(A), a contract that would defeat 
the defense “includes, but is not limited to, land contracts, deeds, 
easements, leases or other instruments transferring title or 
possession.”90 
If, however, the contract falls within this definition, the 
defendant can still avoid liability by satisfying the elements of 
one of the subdefenses within sections 9601(35)(A)(i)–(iii). 
b.  The Relevant Subdefenses to the Third-Party Defense 
(i)  The Innocent Landowner Defense 
The availability of the innocent landowner defense depends 
on what a party knew or should have known before they took 
title to a property.91  Successful assertion of this defense requires 
the defendant to show that, “[a]t the time the defendant 
acquired the facility the defendant did not know and had no 
reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the 
subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of on, 
in, or at the facility.”92  Would-be land purchasers cannot avoid 
liability by sticking their heads in the sand to avoid knowledge 
because those who seek protection must carry out inquiry 
sufficient to meet the rigorous due diligence requirements of “all 
appropriate inquiry.”93  If a purchaser can be proven to be an 
innocent landowner, they will have no liability under CERCLA 
as an owner. 
 
89 Id. § 9601(35)(A). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. § 9601(35)(B).  This section sets the standard for what a purchaser must do 
in order to assert the defense.  The requirements of this inquiry are outside of this 
Article’s trust-specific scope.  Many cases and scholarly works interpret and analyze 
this section of CERCLA, however, and interested readers will not want for material 
on the subject. 
92 Id. § 9601(35)(A)(i). 
93 40 C.F.R. § 312 (2008). 
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(ii)  The Inheritance or Bequest Defense 
The inheritance or bequest defense is available to a covered 
person who can satisfy all of the elements of the third-party 
defense described above,94 except that the third party’s act or 
omission occurred in connection with a contractual relationship.  
In such circumstances, past or present owners can still assert the 
inheritance or bequest defense as an affirmative defense to 
CERCLA liability if they satisfy all of the following elements 
and no other basis for liability applies: 
 
1. The defendant acquired title to the property subsequent to 
 the disposal or placement of the hazardous substance.95 
 
2. The defendant acquired title to the property through 
 inheritance or bequest.96 
 
3. The defendant “provides full cooperation, assistance, and 
 facility access to the persons that are authorized to conduct 
 response actions at the facility (including the cooperation 
 and access necessary for the installation, integrity, 
 operation, and maintenance of any complete or partial 
 response action at the facility).”97 
 
4. The defendant “is in compliance with any land use 
 restrictions established or relied on in connection with the 
 response action at a facility.”98 
 
5. The defendant “does not impede the effectiveness or 
 integrity of any institutional control employed at the facility 
 in connection with a response action.”99 
As such, the following questions are fundamental to the 
determination of the potential CERCLA liability for 
beneficiaries of trusts that include impacted real property: 
 
1. Is a beneficiary, as holder of equitable title, an owner for 
 CERCLA purposes? 
 
94 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. § 9601(35)(A)(iii). 
97 Id. § 9601(35)(A). 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
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2. Does the beneficiary satisfy the elements of the third-party 
 defense except that a contractual relationship exists 
 between the defendant and the third party? 
 
3. Did the beneficiary take title through inheritance or 
 bequest such that the inheritance or bequest defense might 
 apply? 
 
4. Does the beneficiary satisfy the elements of the innocent 
 landowner defense such that this defense might apply if the 
 inheritance or bequest defense fails? 
With respect to beneficiary ownership for CERCLA 
purposes, creation of an express trust in California historically 
vested full title of trust property in the trustee or trustees.100  The 
California legislature repealed this statute in 1986, so the 
modern rule now applies.101  The modern rule holds that creation 
of a trust divides title such that the trustee or trustees take legal 
title, and the beneficiary or beneficiaries take equitable title.102  
For purposes of evaluating the potential CERCLA liability of a 
trust beneficiary based on his or her status as owner, the initial 
question is whether the equitable interest held by trust 
beneficiaries is sufficient to support liability. 
The court in United States v. Wedzeb Enterprises, Inc. 
concluded that an equitable interest, no matter how small, is 
sufficient to support CERCLA owner liability.103  A fire at the 
site at issue in Wedzeb resulted in PCB contamination of the 
property.104  Approximately three months before the fire, one of 
the Wedzeb defendants entered into a contract to purchase the 
site.105  The defendant argued that, at the time of the fire, he had 
paid less than ten percent of the purchase price, and the deed 
was still in escrow at the bank.106  Therefore, the defendant 
argued that he was not an owner under CERCLA at the time of 
 
100 CAL. CIV. CODE § 863 (West 2007) (repealed 1986); see also GEORGE 
GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND 
TRUSTEES § 184 n.25 (2d rev. ed. 1979). 
101 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 863–867 (repealed 1986); see also BOGERT & BOGERT 
supra note 100, § 183. 
102 Castlerock Estates, Inc. v. Estate of Markham, 871 F. Supp. 360, 366 (N.D. 
Cal. 1994). 
103 United States v. Wedzeb Enters., Inc., 809 F. Supp. 646, 652 (S.D. Ind. 1992). 
104 Id. at 649. 
105 Id. at 649, 652. 
106 Id. at 652. 
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the fire.107  The court rejected this argument outright, concluding 
that he was an owner for CERCLA purposes because, under 
Indiana law, equitable title passed to him when he signed the 
purchase and sale agreement.108  Applying the reasoning of 
Wedzeb to trusts, beneficiaries would be owners under 
CERCLA the moment they take equitable title, which could 
occur when the trust is created, or, for testamentary trusts, at the 
time of the settlor’s death.109 
Since ownership status is based on state law, California’s rules 
of ownership changes for purposes of reassessing real property 
values to determine tax liability may provide a useful analogy for 
CERCLA liability analysis.  Those rules imply that beneficiaries 
may be liable as owners under CERCLA based on their 
equitable interest in real property.  In Reilly v. San Francisco,110 
the issue was whether succession of an income beneficiary of a 
testamentary trust by another income beneficiary constituted a 
change in ownership.111  While not a CERCLA case, Reilly may 
provide some guidance as to how courts will approach the 
ownership question for trust beneficiaries in CERCLA cases. 
In Reilly, the settlor, Francis O’Reilly, established a 
testamentary trust in 1965 for his personal and real property.112  
Upon his death in 1966, his grandniece became the sole income 
beneficiary of the trust and was entitled to receive all of the net 
income derived from the trust for the remainder of her life.113  
Should she leave no heirs, a nephew would succeed her as sole 
income beneficiary for the remainder of his life.114  The 
 
107 Id. 
108 Id.  
109 This moment will vary depending upon the means of trust creation and the 
type of trust.  For example, a settlor may lay the foundation for a testamentary trust 
when he properly executes his will.  However, because testamentary trusts do not 
exist until death of the settlor, the beneficiary or beneficiaries of testamentary trusts 
do not actually acquire title until the trust comes into existence upon the settlor’s 
death.  In such cases, the beneficiaries may well be able to assert the inheritance or 
bequest defense.  Perhaps this would not be so with irrevocable trusts created 
during the settlor’s lifetime. 
110 Reilly v. San Francisco, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 291, 291 (Ct. App. 2006). 
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grandniece died in 2000 and had no heirs.115  The nephew 
therefore became the new income beneficiary.116  The City of San 
Francisco Assessor determined that the succession of income 
beneficiaries from the grandniece to the nephew constituted a 
one hundred percent change in property ownership and that the 
City correctly reassessed the subject property for purposes of 
taxation in accord with Proposition 13.117  The nephew appealed 
the determination to the Assessment Appeals Board, which 
agreed with the Assessor.118  Reilly then appealed to the state 
courts.119  The California Court of Appeal for the First District 
agreed with the City.120 
For present purposes, the usefulness of Reilly is not whether 
there was a change in ownership from the grandniece to the 
nephew, but whether they were owners of the real property to 
which they were only entitled the benefit of income.  While all of 
the discussion in that case is about changes in ownership,121 a 
logical analysis requires some conclusions about ownership itself.  
Specifically, in order to have a change in ownership, there must 
first be ownership by at least one entity prior to the change and 
ownership by at least one different entity subsequent to the 
change.  Thus, in order to conclude that transfer of the 
beneficial, equitable interest from the grandniece to the nephew 
constituted a change in ownership,122 the court must have 
determined initially that the grandniece, and then the nephew, 
actually (or at least legally) owned the property.  As there are 
circumstances specified in the California Code of Regulations 
applicable to taxation in which no change in ownership occurs, 
despite the transfer of real property interests into a trust,123 these 
instances support arguments for trust beneficiaries seeking to 
 
115 Id. 
116 Id. (“Reilly is not a beneficiary of the trust’s principal.”). 
117 Id. at 294. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 303. 
121 See id. at 296. (“The question presented here is whether there is a change in 
ownership when one trust beneficiary succeeds another.”). 
122 See id. 
123 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 18, § 462.160(b)(1)(A) (2008). 
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avoid CERCLA owner liability.  These specific situations are 
displayed in Table 1 in the Appendix below. 
With respect to whether title was acquired via inheritance or 
bequest, CERCLA defines neither “inheritance” nor 
“bequest.”124  CERCLA case law also provides no clear rules or 
definitions for what exactly constitutes an inheritance or 
bequest.  Reasoning from the dictionary definitions of 
“inheritance,” “bequest,” and “devise,” property taken through 
testamentary trusts or intestate succession would likely 
constitute inherited or bequeathed property, as the property 
interest transfers upon the death of the prior owner.125  No 
federal court opinions addressing this issue of whether inter 
vivos trusts or lifetime gifts constitute an inheritance or bequest 
for purposes of the inheritance or bequest defense exist.126  The 
only authority on point is Tamposi Family Investments,127 an 
opinion of the Environmental Protection Agency Appeals 
Board. 
In Tamposi, the Appeals Board rejected petitioner’s argument 
that a gift from a father to a real estate investment partnership, 
in which his children were the exclusive partners, should qualify 
for the inheritance or bequest defense.128  Citing Black’s Law 
Dictionary definitions for “inheritance,” “bequest,” and 
“devise,” the Appeals Board found that the text of CERCLA 
 
124 Black’s Law Dictionary does, however, define “inheritance” as (1) 
“[p]roperty received from an ancestor under the laws of intestacy” or (2) 
“[p]roperty that a person receives by bequest or devise.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 787 (7th ed. 1999).  Black’s defines “bequest” as (1) “[t]he act of 
giving property . . . by will” or (2) “[p]roperty . . . disposed of in a will.”  Id. at 152.  
Black’s also defines “devise” as (1) “[t]he act of giving property . . . by will,” (2) 
“[t]he provision in a will containing such a gift,” (3) “[p]roperty . . . disposed of in a 
will,” or (4) “[a] will disposing of real property.”  Id. at 463. 
125 See id. at 152, 463, 787; see also Tamposi Family Invs., 6 E.A.D. 106, 125 
(EPA 1995) (concluding that the use of the words “inheritance” and “bequest” 
evinces an intent to include only those transfers that occur upon death). 
126 At first glance it appears that United States v. Pac. Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 716 
F. Supp. 1341 (D. Idaho 1989) addresses this precise question.  This is not the case.  
In dicta, Pacific Hide concedes the point that an inter vivos, inter-familial transfer is 
a contractual relationship without any real discussion on the matter.  Id. at 1347–48.  
By implication, Pacific Hide is therefore authority for the contention that inter 
vivos transfers fall outside the scope of inheritances or bequests, but this 
determination is not part of Pacific Hide’s holding.  Id. at 1348–49. 
127 Tamposi Family Invs., 6 E.A.D. at 124–25. 
128 Id. 
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indicated that the inheritance or bequest defense was 
inapplicable to inter vivos transfers, as the defense only applied 
to transfers occurring upon death of the prior owner.129  Since it 
is the sole authority on point and an analysis of CERCLA by an 
arm of the EPA itself, courts considering the issue in the future 
will likely find Tamposi highly persuasive and may defer to the 
agency’s interpretation.130  Thus, the best option for settlors 
wishing to protect beneficiaries from CERCLA liability during 
the lifetime of the settlor is to use testamentary trusts and 
devises in wills to transfer interests in impacted property.  They 
should then provide bequests to beneficiaries that may enjoy 
limited liability status due to the form of business (such as an 
LLC not comprised of beneficiary members).  Combining these 
steps with thoughtful timing of sales or distributions to occur 
after cleanup, or in an otherwise protective manner, are also 
optional protective measures.  However, there is currently no 
authority as to what structures will be effective.  The most 
important fact for beneficiaries to keep in mind is that the estate, 
and therefore any property in trust, will always be fully liable if 
the settlor was personally liable.  The question is how to avoid or 
minimize the personal liability of the beneficiaries.  This 
approach is entirely consistent with the settlor’s intent and legal 
status: the settlor owned the property, the settlor was personally 
liable, and the settlor intended to give the beneficiary what he 
possessed during his life.131 
 
129 Id. 
130 Although extremely persuasive, the decision is not a perfect interpretation of 
CERCLA.  Tamposi’s primary flaw is on the issue of inquiry.  The Appeals Board 
cites to the congressional comments on CERCLA as support for the contention that 
individuals who take impacted property by inheritance or bequest must still conduct 
“reasonable inquiry” into the contamination, even if they have no knowledge of the 
inheritance or bequest.  Id. at 125.  Perhaps this was the intent of certain individual 
members of Congress, but this failed to make its way into the text of the statue.  
Nevertheless, the presence of this language in Tamposi raises the possibility that 
some level of inquiry, albeit a very low level, will be required of owners who take 
title by inheritance or bequest. 
131 Potential beneficiaries may be able to disclaim property placed in trust for 
their benefit.  See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 15309 (West 2002) (“A disclaimer or 
renunciation by a beneficiary of all or part of his or her interest under a trust shall 
not be considered a transfer under Section 15300 or 15301.”).  While an enticing 
theoretical solution, practically this is not a good option where the property value 
exceeds, or will exceed, the cost of remediation. 
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2.  Other Possible Tools for Limiting Liability 
a.  Change of Ownership Regulations May Eliminate 
“Unplanned” Ownership Transfers to Beneficiaries 
The California Code of Regulations addresses taxation rules 
for changes in ownership in title 18, section 462.  Section 462.160 
pertains to trusts.  Subsection (a) of section 462.160 provides the 
general rule that transfer of real property interests into trusts, by 
the settlor or anyone else, is a change in ownership;132 subsection 
(b) provides instances excluded from this rule.133  Subsection (c) 
provides the general rule that termination of a trust or any 
portion of a trust, constitutes a change in ownership,134 and 
subsection (d) provides the exceptions to this second general 
rule.135  These rules for exclusions and exceptions–for example, 
those transfers of interests that do not constitute changes in 
ownership–are complex and are therefore presented in the 
Appendix in tabular form in an attempt to simplify 
comparisons.136  While untested in the courts, would-be settlors 
and/or beneficiaries may be able to use these rules as a guide for 
selecting trusts that will make CERCLA owner liability for the 
beneficiaries less likely, or at least delay such potential liability 
until such time as the property may be transferred with less or no 
risk. 
b.  Use of an LLC 
It may be possible to structure a set of circumstances where 
the beneficiary is an LLC that receives title from the trustor 
during the trustor’s lifetime and funds for remediation, if 
necessary, from the settlor at the time of trust creation.  Parties 
who would otherwise be beneficiaries could be members of that 
LLC and be entitled to distribution of LLC assets upon an 
acceptable sale or other acceptable resolution of the 
environmental conditions at issue.  Another potential structure 
would be for the LLC to have a manager that was itself a 
 
132 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 18, § 462.160(a) (2008). 
133 Id. § 462.160(b); see also infra Appendix Table 1. 
134 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 18, § 462.160(c) (stating general rule for termination). 
135 Id. §§ 462.160(d)–(e) (discussing exceptions to changes in ownership and 
inapplicable trusts); see also infra Appendix Table 2. 
136 See infra Appendix Tables 1, 2. 
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fiduciary.  The most conservative approach would likely be to 
designate a third party as the sole member and manager of the 
LLC until distribution, avoiding a unity of interest among 
beneficiaries and the owner of the property.137  This strategy is 
completely untested, however, and courts may conclude that 
such arrangements are ruses and pierce the veil of the LLC to 
hold the members personally liable. 
However, so long as the trust remains liable, limiting the 
liability of the beneficiaries to the extent of trust assets, absent 
misfeasance or malfeasance, seems equitable and consistent with 
general legal principles.  Without any judicial guidance, the 
answer to the question as to whether naming an LLC as a 
beneficiary and appointing a third-party trustee will in fact 
insulate the ultimate beneficiaries from personal liability, absent 
some sort of misconduct, is uncertain. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
The environmental laws, and CERCLA in particular, have 
incredibly long arms.  CERCLA cares not for fault or blame but 
only for status of ownership of real property.  This status 
exposed trustees to personal liability until 1996.  The Asset 
Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance 
Protection Act of 1996, subsequently codified as CERCLA 
section 107(n), took much of the risk out of acting as a trustee 
where contaminated real estate is part of their fiduciary 
responsibility.  But section 107(n) does not completely eliminate 
the potential for personal liability on the part of fiduciaries.  
Trustees face potential personal liability under the 
environmental laws but only in circumstances typically involving 
malfeasance.  The general legal rules that delineate trustee 
liability apply to the environmental laws as well.  That is, where 
a trustee acts responsibly in their fiduciary capacity as trustees, 
they have limited personal liability exposure.138  Where trustees 
 
137 See, e.g., Minkoff v. Koppelman, No. B195081, 2008 WL 217565, at *1 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2008). 
138 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 18002 (West 1991).  Trustees can be liable as 
trustees, meaning that liability for the trustees’ actions may attach to the assets or 
corpus of the trust.  Personal liability for the trustee as an individual will not attach, 
however, unless the trustee is personally liable as an individual.  60 CAL. JUR. 3D 
Trusts § 258 (1980). 
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act as trustees and do so with integrity, both California and 
federal laws work to shield them from personal liability 
exposure.139 
In California, this rule is codified as Health and Safety Code 
section 25548.  Under CERCLA, the rule is codified as section 
107(n).  Both laws contain exceptions, however, and trustees 
should take care to avoid negligent, reckless, self-serving, and 
fraudulent acts, as well as acts that fall outside the scope of their 
fiduciary duties, because such behavior will nullify the protection 
of these laws. 
Beneficiaries have it tougher than trustees.  Unlike fiduciaries, 
no law makes beneficiaries exempt from liability under the 
environmental laws.  Beneficiaries will likely be owners under 
CERCLA of any real property held in trust for their benefit.  
Thus, where appropriate, beneficiaries face CERCLA liability as 
owners, at a minimum, and nothing in the case or statutory law 
indicates that potential liability of beneficiaries is limited to trust 
assets.  However, beneficiaries of testamentary trusts or who 
otherwise obtain their beneficiary interest through inheritance 
or bequest may be able to assert the inheritance or bequest 
defense.  Even if these defenses were found to be inadequate, 
equity militates in favor of limiting beneficiary liability to that 
liability that would attach to the trustor, absent another basis for 
liability on the part of the beneficiary. 
The use of LLCs or other entities as owners remains mostly 
unexplored.  However, CERCLA renders practically any act 
done for the purpose of limiting liability ineffective.140  Setting up 
LLCs made up of parties that already have title, such as a trust 
or beneficiaries, will likely be ineffective as a means of limiting 
liability to the assets of that entity–particularly where the 
entity, such as a trust-owned LLC, has no other function and 
simply holds title to contaminated property.  LLCs contained 
inside a trust are also unlikely to function effectively as a means 
of containing exposure of the remainder of the trust assets and 
 
139 Note that trust law allows for the inclusion of clauses limiting the liability of 
the trustee(s) to the beneficiaries.  76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 336 (2005).  Such 
clauses are not favored and must be written with sophistication in order for courts 
to uphold them.  Additional research into this subject would be necessary in order 
to craft such a clause in any particular case. 
140 See supra text accompanying note 42. 
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quite possibly the estate assets, especially where the trust was an 
owner prior to transfer to the LLC.  All of the above structures 
seem likely to run against the grain of CERCLA’s liability 
scheme, which intentionally leaves little room for liability-
limiting devices with no other redeeming social value or function 
and which are comprised or controlled by those who seek to 
avoid liability. 
Given the foregoing, it appears that the best overall strategy is 
to anticipate transfers in property, to attempt to structure such 
transfers to fall within the statutory defenses, and to preserve 
and pursue rights against other potentially responsible parties. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 1  Instances excluded from the general rule that the 
 creation of a trust constitutes a change in ownership of the 
 trust property141 
 









Lifetime Irrevocable Anyone Settlor only No143 


















Anyone Yes, unless 
another 
exclusion 







Anyone Anyone, but the 





than the settlor 





141 See discussion supra Part III.C.2.a. 
142 Including revocable and irrevocable trusts. 
143 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 18, § 462.160(b)(1)(A) (2008). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. § 462.160(b)(1)(B). 
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Trust in which the 
trust propety includes 
an ownership interest 
in a legal entity that 
holds an interest in 
real property 
Anyone 
Settlor only, or 
Settlor and 
others but 





















Spouse 1 Spouse 2 No149 















Parent/Child Child/Parent No151 
 
147 Id. § 462.160(b)(1)(C). 
148 Id. § 462.160(b)(2). 
149 Id. § 462.160(b)(3). 
150 Id. 
151 Id. § 462.160(b)(4). 
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Anyone Anyone, but the 
proportional 
interest of the 
beneficiaries is 
the same before 
and after 
transfer of the 
property 






of Interest from One 
Trust to Another 
Anyone Anyone No, so long as 
the transfer 










155 Id. § 462.160(b)(5). 
156 Id. § 462.160(b)(6). 
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TABLE 2  Exceptions to the general rule that termination of a 














Prior Change in 
Ownership 
Use or income Holder of use or 
income benefit 
during life of 
trust 
No158 




interest only (i.e., 







Yes, unless an 
exclusion 
applies159 




















interest for no 













157 See discussion supra Part III.C.2.a. 
158 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 18, § 462.160(d)(1). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. § 462.160(d)(2). 
162 Id. § 462.160(d)(3). 
163 Id. § 462.160(d)(4). 





































the interest held 
by the 
beneficiaries 
during the life 
of the trust 
No165 
Other Trusts Interest in 
property in trust 
A 
Interest in 
property in trust 
B 
No, so long as an 
exception applies 




164 Id. § 462.160(d)(5). 
165 Id. § 462.160(d)(6). 
166 Id. § 462.160(d)(7). 
